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Foreword
FOREWORD: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
George A. Martinez*
hroughout the history of ideas, there has been a conflict between
various sorts of dualisms. Thus, for example, some have argued
that there is a dualism between mind and body' and word and
object. 2 This symposium issue of the Southern Methodist University Law
Review focuses on another significant dualism: that of theory and practice. 3 Over the years, thinkers have attempted to bridge the various dualisms. 4 This special issue on clinical legal education fits within this
tradition. It represents an effort to close the gap between theory and
practice. Indeed, clinical legal education may be thought of as an attempt
to put legal theory into practice. Toward that end, the articles that have
been written for this symposium do an excellent job in demonstrating
how legal clinics bridge the gap between theory and practice.
Professors Kevin Johnson and Amagda P6rez's article, titled Clinical
Legal Education and the U.C. Davis Immigration Law Clinic: Putting
Theory into Practice and Practice into Theory, illustrates these themes. 5
P6rez is an expert on legal clinics. Johnson is one of our nation's leading
authorities on immigration law and race theory, and he is well positioned
to discuss the central focus of the article: the relationship between clinical
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; B.A., 1976, Arizona
State University; M.A. (Philosophy), 1979, The University of Michigan; J.D., 1985,
Harvard Law School.
1. See generally Rene Descartes, Meditations, in PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF
DESCARTES (E.S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans., 1969).
2.

See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE TRACTATUS LOGICO PHILOSOPHICUS

(D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness trans., 1974).
3. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Black and White, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1647, 1682 (1997) ("The
liberal canon divides theory and practice into rigid categories."); see also RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE AND AMERICA 86-88

(1995) (describing tensions between legal theory and practice).

4. See generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE
(1979). For a recent discussion of "dualisms at the heart of contemporary legal theory,"
see R. George Wright, What's Gone Wrong with Legal Theory?: The Three Faces of Our
Split Personality, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 371, 372 (1998).
5. Kevin R. Johnson and Amagda P6rez, Clinical Legal Education and the U. C. Davis
Immigration Law Clinic: Putting Theory into Practiceand Practice into Theory, 51 SMU L.
REV. 1423 (1998).
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legal education and subordinated communities. At the outset, Johnson
and Perez note that critical theorists often argue that it is difficult to bring
about social reform through the legal system. As a result, they set out to
address the question of whether clinical legal education is helpful for
subordinated groups. They seek to answer this question by considering
the experience of the Immigration Law Clinic (Clinic) at the U.C. Davis
School of Law as viewed through the lens of Critical Race Theory and
critical lawyering. In so doing, they note that many immigration lawyers
take a dim view of the laws that regulate immigration in this country.
Despite this, the Clinic has made a positive contribution to the lives of
many immigrants. Nevertheless, critical theory predicts and the Clinic's
experience demonstrates that conservative tendencies in law place important limits on what the clinic can achieve. Although it can help raise racial consciousness among law students, the clinic can only accomplish
incremental social change and cannot represent everyone. The clinic has
had little impact on the general state of immigration law which has become increasingly anti-immigrant. This article makes a very important
contribution to the emerging literature on critical theory and legal
practice.
The next article is by Professor Jon Dubin, titled Clinical Design for
Social Justice Imperatives.6 The author of a number of influential articles,
Dubin is an expert on clinical legal education. In his article, he seeks to
connect theory with practice by exploring the relevance of social justice
to clinical legal education. In so doing he focuses on the experience of St.
Mary's University School of Law's Center for Legal and Social Justice in
dealing with certain low-income communities of South Texas. At the outset, Professor Dubin observes that there has been a revival of interest in
the social justice aspects of clinical legal education. This interest has been
generated by critical theory, which has emphasized community development and the analysis of power in law. In his view, clinical legal education is a way to help achieve social justice. He uses the St. Mary's Center
for Legal and Social Justice to show how clinics can put social justice
theory into practice. In this regard, the St. Mary's clinic has sought to
bring about social justice in the poverty belt of South Texas. In explaining the St. Mary's system, Dubin has provided a very helpful blueprint for
other law schools to use if they are interested in incorporating a social
justice perspective into their clinical legal education.
In the final article, Professor David Chavkin, the author of a number of
articles dealing with topics in clinical legal education, addresses an important theoretical question with significant practical implications. In his
contribution, Am I My Client's Lawyer? Role Definition and the Clinical
Supervisor, he considers whether an attorney/client relationship exists be-

6. Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461
(1998).
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tween a clinical supervisor and the legal clinic client.7 He concludes that
in most jurisdictions the prevailing law does not mandate any such relationship. This means that legal clinics are often free to construct the sort
of relationship between the clinic and the client that will best advance
educational objectives and the interests of the client.
8
Currently, in the legal academy there is a backlash against theory.
Thus, there are those who call for academicians to focus on the concerns
of practicing lawyers. 9 This symposium issue is a timely reminder of the
importance of theory to the practice of law.

7. David F. Chavkin, Am I My Client's Lawyer? Role Definition and the Clinical
Supervisor, 51 SMU L. REV. 1507 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Michael Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers Economists

and the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 372 (1998); DENNIS PATrERSON, LAW & TRUTH 137 (1996) (offering a Wittgensteinian argument to the effect that
"[t]heory [in law] is banished not because it is wrong, but because it is irrelevant"). For a
response to the anti-theory, internalist approach to law, see George A. Martinez, On Law
and Truth, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 883 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Legal Education and ProfessionalDevelopment-An Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap,
1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS.
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